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LESSONS OF AN OUTSIDE DIRECTOR
MURRAY WEIDENBAUM*
Experience teaches us to be cautious in blithely accepting as fact things
that everyone knows. In that spirit, this Article draws on my experience
as a corporate director to challenge a few commonly held views.
The three sacred cows that will be engaged (let us not say slaughtered)
are: (1) the widespread knowledge that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) only
benefit a few insider wheeler-dealers (also rejected is the converse belief
that all LBOs contribute to a healthier economy); (2) takeovers are uni-
formly good for shareholders; and (3) investment bankers are the appro-
priate folks to pass judgment on whether a board should approve a
proposed acquisition, merger, or sale.
LBOs
The public policy debate on LBOs is dominated by two polar alterna-
tives. One says LBOs promote a more efficient and competitive econ-
omy. Therefore, they should be encouraged or at least not discouraged.
The other position is that LBOs are an invention of shrewd lawyers and
wheeler-dealers and should be prohibited, or at least made much more
difficult.
But my own board experiences impel me to a third and less dramatic
position. It takes into account the fact that there are two kinds of
LBOs-arm's-length LBOs and management-initiated LBOs.
Most LBOs, especially the smaller ones, are of the arm's-length vari-
ety. They involve a corporation selling off a division or subsidiary to
private investors. This was the case in more than seventy percent of the
LBOs recorded between 1984 and 1987.1
Usually a competitive process is used. An intermediary is hired to
solicit bids from potential buyers. The division's management may be
one of the bidders. The fundamental differentiating characteristic of the
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arm's-length LBO is the clear separation of those who bid for the unit
and those who, representing the existing owners, choose the successful
bidder.
There is considerable evidence-anecdotal and otherwise-attesting to
improvements that frequently occur after the change in ownership. As a
board member of Harbour Group, Ltd., for example, I have voted time
and again to approve such LBOs. The acquisition is almost invariably
followed by a predictable array of tough-minded decisions: stripping out
layers of management and supporting staff; consolidating production
units operating well below capacity; streamlining managerial controls;
and, yes, investing in expansion. In the short term, employment is often
reduced. The longer-run result, far more frequently, is an enhancement
in output, market share, profitability, and jobs.
The new management reduces the high overhead and reporting re-
quirements typically imposed on operating units of multidivisional enter-
prises. From the viewpoint of these large companies, such controls are
necessary for effective supervision. But they come at a high cost.
Moreover, collapsing the many layers of management between an op-
erating division with annual sales of twenty million dollars and the head-
quarters of a ten-billion-dollar-a-year corporation speeds up the
decisionmaking process. That enables the newly independent enterprise
to respond to opportunities foreclosed to the larger firm.
The prospective owners, though, may not have adequate financing to
acquire the unit without substantial borrowing (i.e., leverage). Indeed,
given the tax advantages of debt over equity, they have a powerful incen-
tive to minimize the capital they bring to the new firm.
The second category of LBOs usually involves entire companies. Typi-
cally, the firm's management, together with outside investors, buys out
the shareholders of a public company-and "goes private." Here, the
conflict of interest is fundamental (as we will see a little later, fundamen-
tal conflicts of interest rarely arouse my legal friends). But think of it: in
the management-initiated LBOs, the very same people who are paid to
work for the shareholders wind up representing their own personal
interest.
Recall the infamous statement by F. Ross Johnson, Chief Executive
Officer of RJR Nabisco: "My job is to negotiate the best deal that I can
[Vol. 70:563
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for my people."2 The "people" to whom Johnson was referring during
the LBO negotiations were not the shareholders, but the senior
management.
Inevitably, there are some counterarguments with which we should
deal. Some contend that this second category of LBOs is necessary to
provide greater incentive for management to make tough decisions and
to provide greater leverage than is customary in publicly held firms. But
if an executive earning two million dollars a year (plus all sorts of stock
options and special fringe benefits) does not have adequate incentive to
make the difficult choices required to enhance shareholder value, the an-
swer is obvious: fire the lazy, greedy executive. As for the desire to free
management of controls imposed by the externally elected board of direc-
tors, this board member can only respond that the typical corporate
board operates with a very light touch.
By the way, it is not difficult to identify large, publicly held corpora-
tions that have made those tough decisions while maintaining their tradi-
tional status. In the early 1970s, when Boeing was faced with a major
erosion of its markets, it laid off about one-half of its entire work force,
including many senior, experienced professionals. In the 1980s, the
FMC Corporation so leveraged itself that it attained negative net worth.
Both of these publicly held corporations are now quite successful and, in
the process, have avoided serious takeover battles.
To those uncomfortable with the continued, albeit dampened, trend of
LBOs, the most desirable response is to focus on the aspect of public
policy that gives rise to the phenomenon. I am referring to the double
taxation of dividends, which provides a powerful incentive for debt over
equity.
It is silly to berate business executives who respond to the status quo
by adopting forms of organization that make the most of it. The sensible
answer is to eliminate the preference for debt by doing away with the
discriminatory tax treatment of dividends. But the large budget deficits
make that most unlikely at this time.
TAKEOVERS AND SHAREHOLDERS
The standard position of economists is that the stock market's valua-
tion of takeover efforts is very positive. The evidence is that the stock of
2. Jerry Knight, RJR Nabisco Chief Says He Bid Low for Firm, WAsH. POST, Nov. 29, 1988,
at D1.
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the target goes up quickly on the mere announcement of a tender offer.
The great bulk of the academic literature states that corporate takeovers
promote economic efficiency. After all, why else would share prices rise
on the mere announcement of a takeover effort?
For those who need to be bolstered by data, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) has estimated the dollar gains to shareholders
that have resulted from corporate takeovers. The takeover premium was
computed as the amount that the payment for the stock exceeded the
market value of the stock five days before the initial public announce-
ment. During the period 1981-1986, the aggregate premium or gain to
target-firm shareholders was $123 billion.3 That certainly should con-
vince the skeptics.
But, not content to leave well enough alone, let us pursue the matter a
little further. On reflection, would we have expected the results to be
substantially different? Who would make a bid for a company below its
current market value? Such a takeover attempt would be ridiculed in
financial markets. Naturally, bidding for a company's stock raises its
price. As we teach in Economics 101, an increase in demand for an item,
without a commensurate increase in supply, will result in a higher price.
But the prevailing view in the economic literature goes beyond a re-
statement of the obvious to make a very important assumption: the rise
in shareholder value of the target company reflects the likelihood that the
new management team will prove more effective than its predecessor.
After all, in an efficient market, why else would the share price rise?
Why else would the raiders invest in the target company? That does
sound quite logical.4
But the presumption of enhanced corporate productivity is difficult to
support empirically. It is difficult to reconcile the synergy or efficiency
hypothesis with the large number of post-merger "divorces," especially
those involving the abandonment of the acquired firm or its sale at a loss.
An analysis of over ten thousand acquired companies during the early
1980s revealed that most of them did not perform as well in terms of
sales growth as did comparable companies that remained independent.
3. JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & BERNARD S. BLACK, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
STOCK MARKET PROFITS FROM TAKEOVER ACTIVITY BETWEEN 1981 AND 1986 (1987).
4. See Richard E. Cook, Rhat the Economics Literature Has to Say About Takeovers, in PUB-
LIC POLICY TOWARD CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 1-24 (Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W.
Chilton eds., 1988).
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Moreover, they were more likely to be liquidated for poor performance.5
A study at the Wharton School of fifty-six hostile tender offers initiated
during the period 1975-1982 found that the targets, as a group, had out-
performed their bidders over the preceding two years.6 An analysis by
the staff of the Federal Reserve Board reported that a large sample of
banks acquired by holding companies during 1968-1978 did not perform
any differently from other banks either before or after acquisition.7
In any event, it is premature to jump to the conclusion that stockhold-
ers generally benefit from takeovers. After much research, I came up
with one of those earthshaking conclusions that seem to have escaped the
specialists in corporate finance: for every seller, there is a buyer. What
happens to the stock of the firm that does the taking over? The answer to
this question is almost universally downplayed in the takeover literature.
In that regard, Michael Jensen wrote in a 1988 article in the Journal of
Economic Perspectives, "The gains to buying firm shareholders are
harder to estimate, and no one to my knowledge has done so as yet .... ."'
In this era of modem communication, apparently news still travels to
Cambridge at a very leisurely pace. In a 1987 article in the California
Management Review, Steve Vogt and I had examined the studies that
Jensen and his colleagues cited on the benefits to target shareholders.
Sure enough, the same studies show that the price of the stock of the
acquiring firm usually declines in the period following the announcement
of the merger. In those cases in which the price does not decline, the
odds are that it remains fiat.9
How about the broader SEC study cited earlier? That 1987 study
found that the average above-market return to bidding firms during
1980-1985 was -0.04% for the period ten days before the takeover an-
nouncement to twenty days after.'0 Of course, that figure is not statisti-
5. David L. Birch, Buyer Beware, INC., June 1988, at 21-22.
6. Edward S. Hermann & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers" An
Empircal Study (Paper Presented to the Center for Law and Economics Studies, Columbia Univer-
sity, 1985) (copy on file with author).
7. STEPHEN A. RHOADES, BOARD OF GOvERNORs, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE OPER-
ATING PERFORMANCE OF ACQUIRED FIRMS IN BANKING BEFORE AND AFTER ACQUISITION
(1985).
8. Michael C. Jensen, Takeover Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERP. 21
(1988).
9. Murray Weidenbaum & Stephen Vogt, Takeovers and Stockholders: Winners and Losers,
29 CAL. MGMT. REV. 157-68 (1987).
10. GRUNDFEST & BLACK, supra note 3.
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cally different from zero. Investments in Treasury Bills surely are more
attractive and are a simple measure of the opportunity cost.
It is clear that most owners of the acquiring firm's stock do not evalu-
ate the takeover announcement positively. The widely held belief that
shareholders generally benefit from takeovers does not hold up. There
are both winners and losers. But the distribution of investors within the
two categories is counterintuitive: the owners of the "winning" firms
lose; the owners of the "losing" firms win.
That leads to a related question: What motivates the managements of
acquiring firms to launch risky, difficult, and expensive takeover battles
if, on average, the expected return to their shareholders is zero?
This question must arouse our sense of cynicism, because one of the
standard pleas of the "raiders" is that they are more interested in the
shareholders than the so-called entrenched management. It strains cre-
dulity to believe that the managers of the acquiring companies are so
idealistic that they are willing to risk the assets of their own shareholders
to liberate the downtrodden shareholders of the target firms. Some other
explanation must be sought.
My answer is that corporate managers are no different from other indi-
viduals. Self-interest dominates their decisionmaking. Studies by
Charles A. Peck at the Conference Board show that increasing the size of
a firm promotes management's own interests."1 One-half of the variation
in pay of corporate chief executives is explained by variations in com-
pany size, as measured by sales-that is far more than is explained by
profits. Moreover, the larger the company, the greater the bonuses as a
percentage of salary. Thus, on average, the bigger the company, the
larger the financial rewards to top management.
Those who have examined the workings of board executive compensa-
tion committees are not surprised by these results. The firm's top man-
agement, in the supporting compensation surveys, is typically compared
to peer firms, chosen primarily by size. The psychic rewards of sales
growth are not trivial either. Being on the cover of Fortune or Business
Week--or even Women's Wear Daily-is a heady experience for most
corporate CEOs.
Nevertheless, none of this justifies the various proposals to increase
regulation of takeovers. Typically, they would adversely, albeit inadver-
11. CHARLES A. PECK, ToP EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2-7 (1987).
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tently, affect very desirable changes in corporate control. As is so often
the case, government failure outweighs market failure.
INVESTMENT BANKERS
Having thus insulted corporate managements and economists, whom
have I left out? Oh, yes, investment bankers. As a board member, I find
it fascinating to listen in awe or at least with great deference as some
distinguished, or at least highly paid, investment banker tell us whether
we should go ahead and buy or sell a company or subdivision thereof.
The so-called fairness opinion has become virtually mandatory. That
is especially so since the Trans Union case12 hit so hard the members of a
corporate board who had the temerity to rely on their own judgment and
experience in agreeing to what was clearly a good deal for their share-
holders. The most unforgivable omission on the part of that board was
the failure to do what has become standard practice-to delay the deci-
sion while the corporate secretary, stopwatch in hand, times the boring
reading of trivial detail by the investment banking representative who is
an MBA two years out of graduate school.
I find the entire exercise so fascinating because of the basic conflict of
interest that results. Should the board go ahead with the contemplated
action, the same investment banking firm that renders the fairness opin-
ion is likely to receive a large commission for the resulting transaction.
Typically, that second fee is many times the modest charge for the origi-
nal fairness opinion-which is only a couple of million or so.
The implications are fascinating. If, in a burst of candor, the invest-
ment advisor tells the board that the contemplated action would be a
lousy move for the shareholders, it will only receive the fee for the "fair-
ness" opinion. It would forego the possibility of earning the much more
generous second fee.
Apparently, this situation does not disturb my friends who practice the
law. My only conclusion is they should keep on practicing. Some day,
they may get the hang of it.
12. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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